Tribblix: manual page: hosts

HOSTS_ACCESS(5) File Formats and Configurations HOSTS_ACCESS(5)

NAME

hosts_access - format of host access control files

DESCRIPTION

This manual page describes a simple access control language that is
based on client (host name/address, user name), and server (process
name, host name/address) patterns. Examples are given at the end.
The impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section
for a quick introduction.

An extended version of the access control language is described in
the hosts_options(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.

In the following text, daemon is the process name of a network daemon
process, and client is the name and/or address of a host requesting
service. Network daemon process names are specified in the inetd
configuration file.

ACCESS CONTROL FILES

The access control software consults two files. The search stops at
the first match:

+o Access will be granted when a (daemon,client) pair matches an
entry in the /etc/hosts.allow file.

+o Otherwise, access will be denied when a (daemon,client) pair
matches an entry in the /etc/hosts.deny file.

+o Otherwise, access will be granted.

A non-existing access control file is treated as if it were an empty
file. Thus, access control can be turned off by providing no access
control files.

ACCESS CONTROL RULES

Each access control file consists of zero or more lines of text.
These lines are processed in order of appearance. The search
terminates when a match is found.

+o A newline character is ignored when it is preceded by a
backslash character. This permits you to break up long lines
so that they are easier to edit.

+o Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are
ignored. This permits you to insert comments and whitespace
so that the tables are easier to read.

+o All other lines should satisfy the following format, things
between [] being optional:

daemon_list : client_list [ : shell_command ]

daemon_list is a list of one or more daemon process names (argv[0]
values) or wildcards (see below).

client_list is a list of one or more host names, host addresses,
patterns or wildcards (see below) that will be matched against the
client host name or address.

The more complex forms daemon@host and user@host are explained in the
sections on server endpoint patterns and on client username lookups,
respectively.

List elements should be separated by blanks and/or commas.

With the exception of NIS (YP) netgroup lookups, all access control
checks are case insensitive.

HOST ADDRESSES

IPv4 client addresses can be denoted in their usual dotted notation,
i.e. x.x.x.x, but IPv6 addresses require a square brace around them
- e.g. [::1].

PATTERNS

The access control language implements the following patterns:

+o A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is
matched if the last components of its name match the specified
pattern. For example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host
name `wzv.win.tue.nl'.

+o A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is
matched if its first numeric fields match the given string.
For example, the pattern `131.155.' matches the address of
(almost) every host on the Eindhoven University network
(131.155.x.x).

+o A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an
NIS (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it
is a host member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches
are not supported for daemon process names or for client user
names.

+o An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as
a `net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal
to the bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example,
the net/mask pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches
every address in the range `131.155.72.0' through
`131.155.73.255'.

+o Prefixes can be specified for IPv6 address, e.g.
[2001:DB8::/32]

WILDCARDS

The access control language supports explicit wildcards:

ALL The universal wildcard, always matches.

LOCAL Matches any host whose name does not contain a dot character.

UNKNOWN
Matches any user whose name is unknown, and matches any host
whose name or address are unknown. This pattern should be
used with care: host names may be unavailable due to temporary
name server problems. A network address will be unavailable
when the software cannot figure out what type of network it is
talking to.

KNOWN Matches any user whose name is known, and matches any host
whose name and address are known. This pattern should be used
with care: host names may be unavailable due to temporary name
server problems. A network address will be unavailable when
the software cannot figure out what type of network it is
talking to.

PARANOID
Matches any host whose name does not match its address. When
tcpd is built with -DPARANOID (default mode), it drops
requests from such clients even before looking at the access
control tables. Build without -DPARANOID when you want more
control over such requests.

OPERATORS

EXCEPT Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this
construct matches anything that matches list_1 unless it
matches list_2. The EXCEPT operator can be used in
daemon_lists and in client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be
nested: if the control language would permit the use of
parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c' would parse as `(a EXCEPT
(b EXCEPT c))'.

SHELL COMMANDS

If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command,
that command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next
section). The result is executed by a /bin/sh child process with
standard input, output and error connected to /dev/null. Specify an
`&' at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
completed.

Shell commands should not rely on the PATH setting of the inetd.
Instead, they should use absolute path names, or they should begin
with an explicit PATH=whatever statement.

The hosts_options(5) document describes an alternative language that
uses the shell command field in a different and incompatible way.

% EXPANSIONS
The following expansions are available within shell commands:

%a (%A)
The client (server) host address.

%c Client information: user@host, user@address, a host name, or
just an address, depending on how much information is
available.

%d The daemon process name (argv[0] value).

%h (%H)
The client (server) host name or address, if the host name is
unavailable.

%n (%N)
The client (server) host name (or "unknown" or "paranoid").

%p The daemon process id.

%s Server information: daemon@host, daemon@address, or just a
daemon name, depending on how much information is available.

%u The client user name (or "unknown").

%% Expands to a single `%' character.

Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
underscores.

SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS

In order to distinguish clients by the network address that they
connect to, use patterns of the form:

process_name@host_pattern : client_list ...

Patterns like these can be used when the machine has different
internet addresses with different internet hostnames. Service
providers can use this facility to offer FTP, GOPHER or WWW archives
with internet names that may even belong to different organizations.
See also the `twist' option in the hosts_options(5) document. Some
systems (Solaris, FreeBSD) can have more than one internet address on
one physical interface; with other systems you may have to resort to
SLIP or PPP pseudo interfaces that live in a dedicated network
address space.

The host_pattern obeys the same syntax rules as host names and
addresses in client_list context. Usually, server endpoint
information is available only with connection-oriented services.

CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP

When the client host supports the RFC 931 protocol or one of its
descendants (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) the wrapper programs can retrieve
additional information about the owner of a connection. Client
username information, when available, is logged together with the
client host name, and can be used to match patterns like:

daemon_list : ... user_pattern@host_pattern ...

The daemon wrappers can be configured at compile time to perform
rule-driven username lookups (default) or to always interrogate the
client host. In the case of rule-driven username lookups, the above
rule would cause username lookup only when both the daemon_list and
the host_pattern match.

A user pattern has the same syntax as a daemon process pattern, so
the same wildcards apply (netgroup membership is not supported). One
should not get carried away with username lookups, though.

+o The client username information cannot be trusted when it is
needed most, i.e. when the client system has been compromised.
In general, ALL and (UN)KNOWN are the only user name patterns
that make sense.

+o Username lookups are possible only with TCP-based services,
and only when the client host runs a suitable daemon; in all
other cases the result is "unknown".

+o A well-known UNIX kernel bug may cause loss of service when
username lookups are blocked by a firewall. The wrapper README
document describes a procedure to find out if your kernel has
this bug.

+o Username lookups may cause noticeable delays for non-UNIX
users. The default timeout for username lookups is 10
seconds: too short to cope with slow networks, but long enough
to irritate PC users.

Selective username lookups can alleviate the last problem. For
example, a rule like:

daemon_list : @pcnetgroup ALL@ALL

would match members of the pc netgroup without doing username
lookups, but would perform username lookups with all other systems.

DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS

A flaw in the sequence number generator of many TCP/IP
implementations allows intruders to easily impersonate trusted hosts
and to break in via, for example, the remote shell service. The
IDENT (RFC931 etc.) service can be used to detect such and other
host address spoofing attacks.

Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can use the IDENT
service to find out that the client did not send the request at all.
When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup
result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a
host spoofing attack.

A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host') is
less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
the client's IDENT server is lying.

Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.

EXAMPLES

The language is flexible enough that different types of access
control policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the
language uses two access control tables, the most common policies can
be implemented with one of the tables being trivial or even empty.

When reading the examples below it is important to realize that the
allow table is scanned before the deny table, that the search
terminates when a match is found, and that access is granted when no
match is found at all.

The examples use host and domain names. They can be improved by
including address and/or network/netmask information, to reduce the
impact of temporary name server lookup failures.

MOSTLY CLOSED

In this case, access is denied by default. Only explicitly authorized
hosts are permitted access.

The default policy (no access) is implemented with a trivial deny
file:

/etc/hosts.deny:
ALL: ALL

This denies all service to all hosts, unless they are permitted
access by entries in the allow file.

The explicitly authorized hosts are listed in the allow file. For
example:

/etc/hosts.allow:
ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu

The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
in the host name) and from members of the some_netgroup netgroup.
The second rule permits access from all hosts in the foobar.edu
domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
terminalserver.foobar.edu.

MOSTLY OPEN

Here, access is granted by default; only explicitly specified hosts
are refused service.

The default policy (access granted) makes the allow file redundant so
that it can be omitted. The explicitly non-authorized hosts are
listed in the deny file. For example:

/etc/hosts.deny:
ALL: some.host.name, .some.domain
ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd: other.host.name, .other.domain

The first rule denies some hosts and domains all services; the second
rule still permits finger requests from other hosts and domains.

BOOBY TRAPS

The next example permits tftp requests from hosts in the local domain
(notice the leading dot). Requests from any other hosts are denied.
Instead of the requested file, a finger probe is sent to the
offending host. The result is mailed to the superuser.

/etc/hosts.allow:
in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain

/etc/hosts.deny:
in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \
/usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &

The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
installed in a suitable place. It limits possible damage from data
sent by the remote finger server. It gives better protection than
the standard finger command.

The expansion of the %h (client host) and %d (service name) sequences
is described in the section on shell commands.

Warning: do not booby-trap your finger daemon, unless you are
prepared for infinite finger loops.

On network firewall systems this trick can be carried even further.
The typical network firewall only provides a limited set of services
to the outer world. All other services can be "bugged" just like the
above tftp example. The result is an excellent early-warning system.

DIAGNOSTICS

An error is reported when a syntax error is found in a host access
control rule; when the length of an access control rule exceeds the
capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
that shouldn't. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.

FILES

/etc/hosts.allow, (daemon,client) pairs that are granted access.
/etc/hosts.deny, (daemon,client) pairs that are denied access.

BUGS

If a name server lookup times out, the host name will not be
available to the access control software, even though the host is
registered.

Domain name server lookups are case insensitive; NIS (formerly YP)
netgroup lookups are case sensitive.

AUTHOR

Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
Department of Mathematics and Computing Science
Eindhoven University of Technology
Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513
5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands

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